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From Just War To Just Peace: Re-Visioning Just War Theory From A 
Feminist Perspective 
 
Naomi Malone 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the history of just war theory and critiques it from 
various feminist perspectives.  Using a definition of war as inseparable from the 
system within which it is embedded, the paper contends that just war theory has 
been incorporated into the realist paradigm that predominates current political 
thought, making it susceptible to manipulation.  Most importantly, this usurpation 
has shifted just war theory’s focus from jus ad bellum to jus in bello 
considerations, seriously weakening its deterrent effects on war.  The paper 
proposes its replacement with a just peace theory, discussing several existing 
frameworks and explaining the important part women are playing to achieve its 
principles.  It concludes that although just war principles might still be helpful as a 
framework for limiting the worst excesses of war, current applications do not 
adequately meet the presumption against war and for peaceful settlement of 
disputes that the theory’s originators envisioned.  Just peace theory is an active 
theory  that promotes practices leading to the reduction of violence in all arenas 
and at all levels, from fights in the schoolyard to ethnic conflicts and beyond, 
offering concrete examples that can strengthen the last resort criteria of just war 
theory.
 1
 
Introduction 
But the real and lasting victories are those of peace, and not of war.  
-Ralph Waldo Emerson, Worship 
 
  Traditional just war doctrine is enjoying a revival of interest in the wake of 
transforming global interrelationships and drastic improvements in military 
technology.  In spite of optimism in some quarters that globalization and the 
expansion of liberal democracy is the answer for world peace, events such as the 
genocide in Rwanda, the attacks on the World Trade Center, as well as 
longstanding conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the simmering 
Indian-Pakistani standoff over Kashmir indicate that there are deeper issues at 
work when it comes to war and peace.  The increasing disparity between rich 
and poor nations; ethnic, cultural and religious tensions; and nuclear proliferation 
are just some of the many issues that ensure that war and violence will continue 
to play a predominant role in international relations within the near future.   
What is the definition of war?  The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science 
defines war as “armed conflict between organized groups with objectives they 
deem to be irreconcilable.”  This paper uses Joshua Goldstein’s definition of war 
as “lethal intergroup violence” and the war system within which wars exist as: 
“the interrelated way that societies organize themselves to participate in potential 
and actual wars. In this perspective, war is less a series of events than a system 
with continuity through time. This system includes, for example, military spending 
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and attitudes about war, in addition to standing military forces and actual 
fighting.”1     
 There are three main strands of western philosophical thought about war: 
pacifism, realism and just war theory.  Not all pacifists necessarily disagree with 
the use of just war theory as a basis for evaluating the necessity for war, but they 
believe that the only conclusion that can be made from this analysis is that the 
war cannot be justified and that all conflicts can be resolved through arbitration 
rather than violence.  Realists, on the other hand, are profoundly skeptical of 
using moral precepts in any foreign policy issues, war included.  Its proponents 
argue that power and national security are the only motivating factors in 
interstate relations and thus prompt any decisions regarding war.   In contrast to 
both of these viewpoints, just war theory attempts to restrict wars between states 
by subjecting those in authority to certain precepts concerning their 
commencement, conduct and termination.  
The value of just war theory lies in its ability not to describe the world as it 
is, but to provide a framework for debating the justice of particular wars.  Thus, 
theorists and leaders have shaped and supplemented its principles to adapt to 
the requirements of their particular societies and times.  The first chapter 
concentrates on the historical literature of just war theory, showing that just war 
theory is written exclusively by and for men.   
                                                 
1 Goldstein, Joshua. How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2001. War and Gender. Joshua Goldstein. 16 March 2003 
<http://www.warandgender.com/wgch1.htm> 
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Its secular beginnings in ancient Rome and Greece influenced the early 
Christian apologist Saint Augustine to reconcile Christian pacifism with Rome’s 
need to defend its borders against encroaching invaders.  Later, as the Roman 
Empire splintered into factions that progressively coalesced into states, theorists 
supplemented or reinterpreted its doctrines to justify wars between themselves.  
Gradually, the theory returned to its secular roots as the Enlightenment eroded 
the invincibility of the Church, eventually becoming embedded in international 
laws of war originally designed by the Dutch jurist Grotius and Christian 
scholastics such as Francisco Suarez and Francisco Vitoria.  Finally, a European 
system of states based upon the principles of state sovereignty and international 
law arose from the ashes of the Thirty Years War and culminated in the “Peace 
of Westphalia.”.  During the 19th and early 20th centuries, this combination of the 
codification of war with the ascendancy of state sovereignty led to a significant 
shift of the doctrine’s emphasis from the original jus ad bellum (just cause) 
questions to those of jus in bello (just methods during war), allowing the theory to 
flourish even as Western nations use self-interested reasons to justify their 
positions.  This overlying theme continues to emphasize “balance –of–power” as 
the world shaping principle, subjugating just war theory to the role of apologist.  
As Nicholas Rengger indicates “many of the arguments surrounding deterrence 
policy during the Cold War, military interventions (or lack of them) from the 
1960’s to the 1990’s and the “war against terrorism” now are couched in the 
language that would be broadly familiar to those theologians, philosophers and 
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jurists who largely created the just war tradition, even if the context of the 
debates has changed beyond recognition.”2   
Modern secular literature purporting to represent non-realist views 
includes Michael Walzer’s works, among them his influential Just and Unjust 
Wars and Brian Orend’s book which stresses not only the two dimensions usually 
described as just war theory ( jus ad bellum and jus in bello ) but the equally 
important principle of  jus post bellum (just end to war.)  These works accentuate 
a legalistic paradigm based on universal human rights.  In contrast, there is still a 
strong religious strand of just war thought that continues to emphasize the 
original casuistical tradition, especially found in the American Catholic Bishops’ 
The Challenge of Peace.   
The references cited in Brian Orend’s recent book War and International 
Justice: A Kantian Perspective  include only two books that include feminist 
viewpoints on the topic, both edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. This paucity 
reflects both the current “maleness” of the topic and the lack of feminist writers 
who either have addressed the issue or have been allowed to publish their 
thoughts in mainstream journals.  According to Goldstein, this exclusion mirrors 
the inherent inhospitability of the fields of political science and international 
relations to issues about women and gender.  He contends that feminist works 
written about war and peace are written primarily by women and that these 
feminist contributions are seldom found in mainstream journals.   
                                                 
 
2 Rengger, Nicholas. “On The Just War Tradition In The Twenty-First  Century.” International 
Affairs 78.2 (2002): 353. 
 5
Within this feminist literature, Jean Bethke Elshtain’s works on just war 
theory continue to create a postmodern as well as religious space within the 
larger just war debate.  Sara Ruddick and Carol Cohn are some other feminists 
who specifically address just war theory. 
There is also a body of feminist work on war and peace that sheds light on 
many other feminist perspectives on war and violence: “From Lourdes Baneria's 
and Rebecca Blank's (1989) feminist empiricist discussion of "Women and the 
Economics of Military Spending" to Elshtain's (1987) postmodernist explorations 
of gendered war narratives; from Judith Stiehm's (1989) empirical research on 
women in the U.S. military to the epistemologically varied essays that form 
Adrienne Harris' and Ynestra King's (1989) volume on how feminists think about 
peace and the parallel volume edited by Sharon MacDonald, Pat Holden, and 
Shirley Ardener (1988) on images of women in war and peace, we find a stream 
of efforts to consider who owns, is constituted by, accepts, challenges, and 
rejects IR's wars and peaces.”3   According to Jacqui True, these represent “very 
contradictory and overlapping positions, discourses and practices.”4  
Nonetheless, this diversity does not preclude the possibility of a feminist debate 
on just war theory.  Feminist ethics derives much of its vitality from such diversity.   
The chapter analyzes just war from these broad perspectives found in “the 
three epistemologies commonly referred to in the feminist IR literature as feminist 
                                                 
3 Christine Sylvester, “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International Relations”, 
International Studies Notes, 16/17, (Fall 1991/Winter 1992) 3/1:32-38 Feminist Theory and 
Gender Studies. International Studies Association.  23 June, 2002. 
<http://csf.colorado.edu/isa/ftgs/femir.html > 
 
4 True, Jacqui, “Feminism”, Theories of International Relations, eds. S. Burchill and A. Linklater, 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 1996, 212. 
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empiricism, feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism.”5   Feminist 
empiricists argue that the male-centric framework within which research is done 
in political science and international relations makes value-free and objective 
knowledge impossible.  Judith Stiehm’s empirical research on women in the U.S. 
Military, Arms and the Enlisted Woman is representative of this viewpoint.  
Feminist standpoint theorists believe that people's perceptions of society differ 
because they have different outlooks. Borrowing from Marxism, feminist 
standpoint theorists contend that women have access to knowledge unavailable 
to mainstream society because of their marginalization.  They attempt to take 
account of the standpoints of a diversity of women’s viewpoints, as well as those 
of other marginalized groups. According to Christine Sylvester, this viewpoint 
argues “that women's biology and-or habitual social assignments as mothers and 
caretakers position women against the violence of war as a means of settling 
disputes (e.g. Brock-Utne, 1985; Ruddick, 1989), and help them to develop a 
politically viable standpoint on wars, peaces, insecurities, and militaristic tamings 
in our lives (Reardon, 1985; Enloe, 1983).”6 Feminist postmodernists, on the 
other hand, are skeptical about universal categories such as “women” and 
“science”, seeking forms of knowledge and truth that show the fractured nature of 
identities, allowing them to discover and resolve existing injustices.7     
                                                 
5 True, 213. 
 
6 Sylvester. 
 
7 These definitions are based on several different sources, primarily True, 214,215 and Sylvester, 
Christine.  Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994.10,11. 
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There is a general consensus that women value peace more than men, and 
several statistical studies do point to the fact that they are more actively 
involved in peace movements than men are.8  However, the issue runs much 
deeper than whether women are by nature more “peacable” than men: 
Virginia Sapiro and Pamela Conover’s analysis of American surveys (dealing 
with hypothetical security policies as well as concrete questions about the use 
of military force and its consequences) shows that “when we moved from the 
abstract to the concrete—from hypothetical wars to the Gulf War—the 
distance separating women and men grew, and on every measure, women 
reacted more negatively.”9  Some feminists try to distance themselves from 
such studies by arguing that they only emphasize differences between 
masculine and feminine characteristics, shifting the focus away from the goal 
of incorporating women’s contributions into mainstream decision-making 
about war and peace. However, others call attention to the difference 
concluding that “feminist perspectives on peace, security, and conflict 
resolution challenge a traditional understanding of peace processes as the 
expression and ratification of power over, such as when one side forces the 
other to accept the terms of cease-fire, emphasizing instead an 
                                                 
8 Peach, Lucinda. “An Alternative to Pacifism?  Feminism and Just-War Theory,” 1994. Bringing 
Peace Home.: Feminism, Violence and Nature. Eds. K.J. Warren and D.L. Cady.  Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 193. 
 
9 Eichenberg, R.C. “Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United 
States, 1990-2003”. International Security 28.1 (2003):110-41. 
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understanding of peace as a process of negotiation and conflict resolution 
where both sides come out as winners.”10   
This paper’s discussion of feminist ethics integrates these various 
discourses into an analysis and critique of just war that illuminates the gendered 
nature of war and the war system within which it is embedded, making the case 
that just war theory’s efficacy is currently compromised by its containment within 
the realist paradigm.  
  The next chapter proposes the theory of just peace, a holistic theoretical 
and practical framework based on the belief that war is not episodic but endemic 
within the fabric of our societies.  Rather than repudiating the existing world 
system, this belief offers the hope that wars can be prevented from within by 
creating modes of negotiation and reconciliation practices to reduce and 
eventually end the necessity for violence.  
This paper contends that just war theory’s usurpation by realism 
downplays the important principle of “last resort”, placing war over and above 
negotiation and conflict resolution as a viable method for securing peace.  It 
acknowledges that just war theory can provide a structure for analyzing certain 
wars in very specific ways.   However, an analysis solely within this framework 
cannot offer a comprehensive picture because it does not take into consideration 
the wider social and cultural aspects within which the war takes place.  Also, its 
rhetoric is frequently co-opted to achieve political and social ends (both selfish 
                                                 
10 Rabrenovic, Gordana and Laura Roskos. “Introduction: Civil Society, Feminism, and the 
Gendered Politics of War and Peace.” National Women’s Studies Association Journal 13.2 
(2001):43. 
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and altruistic) that may not be just.  In addition, there is a continued shift of 
emphasis from jus ad bellum to jus in bello principles, making it easier for 
governments to justify wars as long as they are perceived to be complying with 
international rules of law.  For example: 
The United States and it allies practice a new style of legal warfare-
what Schmitt called “Bellum Americanum”-that hinges on precision-guided 
bombs, standardized targeting, accepted levels and types of collateral 
damage, and high bomber flight altitudes.  Once considered obstacles to 
the war effort, military lawyers have been integrated into strategic and 
tactical decisions, and even accompany troops into battle.  Never has the 
conduct of war been so legalistic.11 
 
The paper concludes that although just war principles can serve as a 
framework for limiting the worst excesses of war, current applications do not 
adequately meet the presumption against war and peaceful settlement of 
disputes that the theory’s originators envisioned.  On the other hand, far from 
being a mere synthesis of just war theory and pacifism, just peace is an active 
theory  that promotes practices leading to the reduction of violence in all arenas 
and at all levels, from fights in the schoolyard to ethnic conflicts and beyond. 
These practices offer just war theory concrete examples of actions that are 
available as “last resorts”, creating the possibility that just war theorists’ debates 
will again emphasize the principles used to decide whether a war should be 
fought rather than whether a war that has already begun is fought justly.   
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Rengger, 356. 
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The History of Just War Theory 
Greek and Roman Sources 
An unjust peace is better than a just war. ―Marcus Tullius Cicero 
 Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, particularly his description 
of the Melian Dialogue, suggests that the Greeks approached war from a realist 
perspective.  In his narrative, the Athenian delegates sent to secure Melian 
support in their war respond to the Melian’s desire to remain neutral by 
proclaiming: “Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to 
conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one 
can.  This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon 
it when it was made.  We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to 
exist for ever among those who come after us.  We are merely acting in 
accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power 
as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.” 12 
However, several Greek philosophers disagreed with that point of view, 
exclaiming that Athens did not fight unjust wars.  One of these was Isocrates, 
who in his correspondence with the Cypriot prince Nicocles exhorted him to 
make no unjust wars, honor all treaties and refrain from the desire to rule all men. 
Further, in direct contrast to the Athenian delegation’s reply to the Melians, 
                                                 
 
12 Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War, Book 5, Chapter 7, translated by Rex Warner. London: 
Penguin, 1955. Quoted in  Luard, Evan.  Basic Texts in International Relations. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992 120-126. 
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Isocrates declared that the foreign policy of Athens followed the principle “It is not 
just for the strong to rule the weak.”13  Another dissenting voice was 
Demosthenes, who praised the justness of the Athenians (in the aftermath of 
their defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars) by arguing that Athens was defending all 
of the Greeks against Sparta.14  Of course, this rhetoric did not include wars 
against the “barbarian” states outside of the Panhellenic arena, as noted by 
Doyne Dawson: “Since there was considered little possibility of a reasonable 
communication with foreigners, the only way to settle disputes with them was by 
battle.  And the only norm in such battle was what benefited the city-state and its 
needs.  All particular actions or general practices in battle were judged solely by 
how expedient they were toward military and thus civic success.”15 
 This ability to separate the Greeks from the “others/barbarians” 
allowed them to make a distinction between the morality of wars fought amongst 
themselves and those fought with “barbarians”.  For example, Plato in his 
Republic proposed a new code of warfare in which all wars between the Greek 
city-states would be civil wars, with the stipulation that the defeated could not be 
enslaved or subjected to occupation or dishonored whereas wars with barbarians 
                                                 
13 References to Isocrates are cited from Dawson, Doyne. The Origins of Western Warfare. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. 66. The quote is taken from Isocrate’s On the Peace, 
a pamphlet written about 355 B.C. to curb the Athenians’ imperial ambitions. In To Nicocles, 
Isocrates further advises the prince to “be polemikos, “warlike,” in always being prepared for war, 
but eirenikos, “peacable,” in never going to war without a just cause.”   
 
14 Dawson. 68. 
 
15 LaCroix, W.L. War and International Ethics : Tradition and Today. Lanham, New York & 
London: University Press of America,1988. 31. The Greeks believed that foreigners were inferior, 
making it possible for them to reconcile their taking of the vanquished as slaves.    
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were to be fought with utmost ruthlessness.16  Aristotle expressed this idea in his 
Politics, Book VII, 14, 1333b39-1334a2: “Neither should men study war with a 
view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of 
all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place 
obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a 
general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only 
over those who deserve to be slaves.”17 
Ironically, Aristotle’s pupil Alexander the Great created a Hellenistic 
empire that not only spread Greek culture and influence to the “barbarians” but 
had the unforeseen effect of lessening the sharp distinctions drawn between 
them by the earlier philosophers.  This more cosmopolitan view was reflected in 
the philosophical movement known as Stoicism, which had many supporters in 
the Greco-Roman world, including the early Christian theologians.  The basis of 
Stoicism was that nature and the universe were governed by the laws of reason.  
It significantly influenced the thought of Marcus Tullius Cicero, a great Roman 
statesman and orator (106-43 B.C.), whose writings on war ethics had an 
enormous impact on future just war theories. He argued that the Stoic idea of a 
universal natural order should be the source of all human laws and communities.  
In one of his clearest statements on this concept, he wrote, “that law was neither 
a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor established by any decree of the 
                                                 
16Dawson, 71.  Dawson notes that Plato hoped this would make the Greeks unite in slave raids 
against barbarian territories, bringing more peace and cooperation between the city-states.  
 
17 Aristotle. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. trans. Jonathan Barnes, ed. Stephen 
Everson Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 188. 
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people, but a certain eternal principle, which governs the entire universe.”18 He 
applied this principle to war between states in his treatise On Duties: “Then, too, 
in the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly 
observed. For since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; 
second; by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter 
of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of 
discussion. The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in 
peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have 
not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare.” 19  
This statement, among others, laid the groundwork for subsequent 
formulations of the two basic tenets of just war theory: jus ad bellum (just 
cause) and jus in bello (just conduct.)  Two important principles of jus ad 
bellum that he espoused were that  just wars could only be waged by 
those with the right authority (such as states) and that a formal declaration 
of war was required: “As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in 
the fetial code of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; 
and from this it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered 
                                                 
18 The Treatises of M.T. Cicero, trans. C.D. Yonge. London: George Bell and sons, 1876. 431, 
quoted in Holmes, Robert L. On War and Morality. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1989. 154. 
 
19 Cicero, Marcus Tullius.  De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1913, Book I.34. The Stoic Legacy to the Renaissance. 5 January 2002. 
<www.stoics.com > 
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upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or 
warning has been given and a formal declaration made.” 20   
Christian Reflections on Just War 
The purpose of all wars is peace. ―Saint Augustine of Hippo 
The gradual decline of paganism in the Roman Empire through the fourth 
century coincided with the elevation of Christians to positions of power. However, 
after Constantine’s acceptance of Christianity as the state religion,  Rome began 
its long and ultimately unsuccessful struggle to stem the tide of aggression by the 
Huns, Vandals and Goths along its borders. The Empire’s decline led many of its 
citizens to return to paganism, proclaiming that Christianity’s ascendancy had 
angered Rome’s gods. As the situation became more perilous the early Christian 
pacifist motive gave way to the realization that it would be necessary to take up 
arms to defend against the never ending onslaught.      
Saint Augustine, considered my many to be the father of modern just war 
theory,  took on the monumental task of reconciling the peaceful precepts of 
Jesus to the political realities of his era: “Like Plato and Cicero, Augustine saw 
war as a fact of life.  Unlike them, he never saw it as an honorable, let alone 
glorious activity.  Nor was Augustine’s just war theory simply a Christianization of 
Cicero’s natural law thinking…..Augustine struggled to synthesize the rigorous 
                                                 
20 Cicero, Book I.36. 
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demands of Christian love with a keen understanding of political realities and a 
pessimistic view of human nature.”21 
 After becoming Bishop of Hippo in North Africa, Augustine strove to find 
answers to this dilemma in the Scriptures.  His deep-seated pessimism about 
human nature stemmed from his belief in the fall of Adam and Eve, which he 
assumed was the cause of all war and created in him a worldview that was 
inhabited by the saved and the damned.  The latter inhabited the “City of Man” 
whereas the saved lived in the “City of God.”  Developing Cicero’s concept of just 
war, Augustine set down the first condition that the sole right to wage war must 
be given by the proper authority.  His second condition was that war must be 
fought with the intention of re-establishing a just peace: “Even wicked men wage 
war to maintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that if possible all men 
belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might 
either through love or fear yield themselves to peace with him.”22 His major break 
from Cicero and the Greek philosophers was his repudiation of glory as a proper 
justification for war.  He saw warfare as the greatest of all evils, asking “Why 
allege to me the mere names and words of “glory” and “victory”?  Tear off the 
disguise of wild delusion, and look at the naked deeds; weigh them naked, judge 
them naked.”23 
                                                 
21 Adenay, Bernard T.  Just War, Political Realism, and Faith. Metuchen, N.J. & London: The 
American Theological Library Association, 1988. 
  
22Augustine, The City of God, Marcus Dods, trans., Great Books of the Western World, vol. 18. 
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1957, Bk. XII, Ch. 22, 357.  Quoted in Adeney, p. 30.  
 
23 Augustine, III, Ch. 13, 174. 
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Secular Revisions 
I saw in the whole Christian world a license of fighting at which even barbarous 
nations might blush. Wars were begun on trifling pretexts or none at all, and carried 
on without any reference of law, Divine or human." 
--Hugo Grotius  
 
The disintegration of Rome into warring factions led to a period of 
centuries during which just war theory was largely ignored.  Later theorists, most 
importantly Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius and Francisco di Vitoria built on 
Augustine’s model to develop a set of rules and regulations that promoted the 
proper conduct of war, leading to a clearer delineation between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello principles. This latter set of principles added another facet to the 
theory by requiring that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions.24  
The rules of just cause remained basically the same during this period: having 
just cause, being declared by the right authority, and having peace as the goal.  
However, the jus in bello principle of discrimination, concerning who were the 
legitimate targets of war, became an important part of the tradition during this 
time. 
Although Aquinas was a religious thinker, he began the process of 
secularizing just war doctrine by revitalizing Aristotle’s thoughts in his seminal 
work Summa Theologica to create the theological system upon which the 
modern Catholic Church is based.  Here, he defined natural law as something 
that could be discerned without divine inspiration, stating that “the rule and 
measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts." 
                                                 
24 Mosely, Alex. “Just War Theory”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2001 15 June 2002. 
<http://www.utm.edu/ research/iep/j/justwar.htm > 
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25  He used this law to refine Augustine’s precepts for just war by using reason 
alone.  Also, the “doctrine of double effect”, a rule of conduct that proved 
valuable in later just war thinking, was often attributed to Aquinas because of his 
argument that “Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of 
which is intended, while the other is beside the intention.”26  Simply put, the 
doctrine maintained that it may be permissible to perform a good act with the 
knowledge that bad consequences will ensue, but that it is always wrong 
intentionally to do a bad act for the sake of good consequences that will ensue.  
Later theologians, particularly the Jesuit priest Jean Pierre Gury, developed this 
principle, making it applicable to a host of moral and theological issues. However, 
it was Francisco de Vitoria in the 16th century who first applied it to the jus in bello 
question of how to treat non-combatants in war.  In his lecture De indis, he 
considered the problem of violence committed by the conquistadors against 
Indians during their conquest of Peru. He concluded that the Indians had rights 
equal to the Spaniards and could not be treated as inferior beings that could be 
exploited and enslaved. This led to the creation of jus gentium, or the law of 
nations, establishing international norms of behavior among nations based on 
natural law. In response to the misery brought about by improvements in military 
technology combined with the voracious power struggles between monarchs 
during the Renaissance, de Vitoria, along with fellow Scholastic Francisco 
                                                 
25 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica First Part of the Second Part, Q. 90, trans. Fathers of the 
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Suarez, added further conditions for just war: first, that the means employed in 
the fighting of war should be proportionate to the ends; second that all peaceful 
alternatives should be exhausted; and third, that there should a reasonable hope 
of victory.  There are opposing camps on the issue of who was the “father of 
international law”, Vitoria or Hugo Grotius.  Most secular writers side with Grotius, 
the author of the famous treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Rights of War 
and Peace).  Here, he attempted to ground just war precepts on natural law 
rather than Christian doctrine, recognizing two alternatives to divine law: the law 
of nature and the law of nations.  Influenced by Aquinas, Grotius’ law of nature 
was derived from universal truths understood through human reason.  The law of 
nations was derived from customary practices and relationships between states 
in the real world.27  
Just War Theory in the Twentieth Century 
War is so awful that it makes us cynical about the possibility of restraint, and then 
it is so much worse that it makes us indignant at the absence of restraint. Our 
cynicism testifies to the defectiveness of the war convention, and our indignation 
to its reality and strength.  — Michael Walzer 
 
 Just war theory was further codified into international law when two 
documents were issued in the wake of World War II: the Nuremburg and United 
Nations Charters.  The first charter established the conditions constituting unjust 
acts in the course of war. 28 The United Nations Charter, especially Article 51, 
                                                 
27 Roosevelt, Grace. “A Brief History of the Quest for Peace: Pacifism and Just War Theory in 
Europe from the 16th to the 20th Centuries.” Global Policy Forum. 23 June 2003. 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/resource/unhist/jinx1.htm > 
 
28 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol 1.  Avalon Project. Yale Law School. 9 March 2003.   < 
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declared the right of sovereign nations to self-defense.  However, it was largely 
ignored as a theory until the mid-twentieth century, when it became a 
cornerstone for arguments against the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War.  
In response to the threat of nuclear war during the height of the Cold War, The 
United States Catholic Conference issued  The Challenge of Peace: God’s 
Promise and Our Response in 1983, a comprehensive evaluation of just war 
doctrine condemning the use of nuclear weapons and laying out plans for 
shaping a peaceful world.  Its  just war criteria  are shown in Table 1.   
Table 1: Just War Criteria 
jus ad bellum:  why and when recourse to war is permissible 
1. Just Cause War is permissible only to confront a ‘real and certain danger’ 
To preserve innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for 
decent human existence and to secure basic human rights. 
2. Competent 
Authority 
War must be declared by those with responsibility for public 
order, not by private groups or individuals. 
3. Comparative 
Justice 
Do the rights and values involved justify killing?  In other words, 
which side is sufficiently ‘right’ in the dispute, and are the values 
at stake critical enough o override the presumption against war? 
4. Right Intention This has two parts.  In just cause, war can be intended only for 
the reasons set forth in just cause.  During the conflict, it 
includes the pursuit of peace and reconciliation and avoiding 
unnecessarily destructive acts or unreasonable conditions. 
5.  Last resort All peaceful alternatives must be exhausted.  Here the Bishops 
stress the importance of the United Nations as a governing body 
that can help alleviate some of the problems inherent in these 
criteria. 
6. Probability of 
Success 
The purpose of these criteria, although difficult to apply, is to 
prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the 
outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile. 
7 Proportionality The damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred must be 
proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. 
jus in bello:  how the war should be conducted 
1. Discrimination Requirement to avoid killing non-combatants, a criterion that is 
becoming harder to comply with. 
2. Proportionality Each action must be judged according to the level of force 
required, with the least possible force used to achieve victory. 
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However, modern just war theory owes a great debt to Just and Unjust 
Wars, Michael Walzer’s attempt to establish a constructivist (as opposed to 
realist) secular and modern version of just war based on linking states’ rights to 
individual rights rather than the rights of princes as earthly representatives of 
God’s authority:   
The rights of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is 
consent of a special sort. State rights are not constituted through a series 
of transfers from individual men and women to the sovereign . . . what 
actually happens . . . [is that] over a long period of time, shared 
experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape a 
common life . . . most states do stand guard over the community of their 
citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of 
their defensive wars.29 
 
  Through this linkage, Walzer sets up a “legalist paradigm” of six 
principles that must be shared by states in the international arena: 
1. There exists an international society of sovereign states.  
2. This international society has laws that establishes the right of its 
members – above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty 
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the 
political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal 
act.  
4.  Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense 
by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other 
member of international society.  
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.  
6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be 
punished.30 
 
However, he argues that in some cases, any or all of these principles may 
need to be violated, even advocating the use of “pre-emptive” attacks in 
                                                 
29 Michael Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second 
edition, New York: Basic Books, 1992. 53–4.  
30 Walzer.,61–2. 
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situations where there is a manifest intent to injure, proof of preparation that 
shows the intent to be a danger, or a general situation in which the risk of defeat 
is greatly increased if war is delayed.  One example is the Israeli strike on Egypt, 
June 5, 1967 during the Six-Day War, just after Egypt had declared its intention 
of extermination. 31 
He also revises earlier discussions of the “doctrine of double effect” by 
offering three conditions that must be met to reconcile effects (such as the killing 
of non-combatants) emanating from actions made with just intent.   First, the 
direct effect must be morally acceptable (for example, the desired result is the 
destruction of a legitimate military target.)  Second, the actor’s intention must be 
good, and the bad effect not intentional.  In this case, the actor should not use 
the bad effect as a means to the ends.  For example, it is wrong to target civilians 
for the purpose of weakening an enemy’s resolve.  Third, the good effect must be 
sufficiently good to justify the bad effect.   Here again, he advocates the violation 
of one of the principles, namely the second condition, by proposing his 
controversial notion of “supreme emergency”, in which unjust means may be 
justified in rare cases, using the example of Britain’s carpet bombing of Dresden 
as justifiable because of the need to combat the “abominable evil” of the Hitler 
regime.  Nonetheless, he concludes that this conduct must be eschewed when 
the aim is reached, with immediate reinstatement of the just war criteria that were 
violated.  In his review of Walzer’s book, Gilbert Meilaender describes how 
Britain resolved this dilemma after World War II: 
                                                 
31 Walzer. 81. 
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After the bombing of German cities had succeeded and the war had 
been won, Britain needed to find a way to reinstate the moral rules it 
had—in the moment of supreme emergency—overridden. Walzer 
interprets the dishonoring of Arthur Harris as such a reinstatement. Harris 
had directed the British Bomber Command’s campaign of terror against 
German cities. He had, it is perhaps not too strong to say, been good 
enough to be on the right side but not too good to do what was needed in 
Britain’s time of peril. 
After the war he expected his reward: public honor. He received 
none, however, and finally left Britain and returned to his native Rhodesia. 
By dishonoring him, Britain dissociated itself from what had been done—it 
reinstated the moral code. We may, Walzer grants, feel that this is not 
quite fair to Harris, but it may be the best a people can manage.32 
 
 Brian Orend incorporates Walzer’s human rights approach to launch a 
fresh interpretation of just war theory based on the works of Immanuel Kant. The 
importance of this thesis lies in its emphasis on an aspect of just war that is 
virtually ignored by most other theorists: the jus post bellum principles applying to 
the end process of creating a just peace.  He divides this final component into 
short term and long term principles.  The short term principles deal with the 
termination of conflicts as they relate to specific wars.  The long term principles 
have a more ambitious agenda, the progressive elimination of war in general.  
This dichotomy represents the inherent tension between what Orend believes are 
the two necessary ingredients for the complete just war theory that the Kantian 
method provides: a comprehensive theoretical framework and a set of principles 
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for practical application.  Table 2 completes the picture of just war theory as it 
stands today. 33 
Table 2: Just War Criteria (addition) 
jus post bellum:  when and how war is concluded 
1. Just Cause for 
termination 
A state has just cause to seek termination of the just war in question if 
there has been a reasonable vindication of those rights whose violation 
grounded the resort to war in the first place. 
2. Right Intention A state must intend to carry out the process of war termination only in 
terms of those principles contained in the other jus post bellum rules. 
Revenge is strictly ruled out as an animating force. Furthermore, the just 
state in question must commit itself to symmetry and equal application with 
regard to the investigation and prosecution of any jus in bello war crimes. 
3. Public 
declaration and 
legitimate 
authority 
The terms of the peace must be publicly proclaimed by a legitimate 
authority. 
4. Discrimination In setting the terms of the peace, the just and victorious state is to 
differentiate between the political and military leaders, the soldiers and the 
civilian population within the aggressor regime. 
5.  Proportionality Terms of peace are proportional to reasonable rights vindication and do 
not violate the human rights of the populace, thereby negating the concept 
of unconditional surrender. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Orend, Brian. War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective. Waterloo & Ontario, 
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Feminist Analysis of Just War 
Introduction 
Where are the women? ―Cynthia Enloe 
 A commentary written by journalist Cynthia Peters in the online magazine 
ZNET evokes the frustration that feminists feel about the roles that women are 
designated to play in wartime.  To illustrate this point, she quotes the headline of 
a satirical piece in Onion Magazine: “Not Knowing What Else to Do, Woman 
Bakes American Flag Cake.”  Continuing with the story, she quotes: “Having 
already donated blood, mailed a check to the Red Cross, and sent a letter of 
thanks to the New York Fire Department, she settled on the red, white, and blue 
creation as her next response to the terror.”34   
Lucinda Peach describes a possible reason for this frustration: “Women 
remain largely absent from ethical and policy debates regarding when to go to 
war, how to fight a war, and whether resorting to war is morally justifiable.”35  One 
explanation for this absence is that the making, waging and concluding of wars 
has traditionally been male-centric. As the previous chapter shows, just war 
theory follows this tradition by being almost exclusively written by and for men.  
Within the time between the two Gulf wars with Iraq, there have been very few 
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feminist voices to be heard in these mainstream debates, with the exception of 
Jean Bethke Elshtain, who has written several books on various theoretical and 
specific aspects of this topic.  However, it is possible to construct a feminist 
vision of just war and peace by examining the variety of feminist based 
approaches to ethics that have developed in response to the underrating of 
women’s moral experience.  The first section of this chapter provides an 
historical overview of feminist moral approaches, concentrating primarily on 
those issues related to war and peace.  The second section delineates feminist 
critiques of contemporary applications of just war theory.  The chapter concludes 
that contemporary just war theory lacks the depth and breadth necessary to 
confront issues such as intra- and non-state forms of violence. 
Feminist Ethics 
Feminist ethics is born of women's refusals to endure with grace the arrogance, 
indifference, hostility, and damage of oppressively sexist environments.  
                                                                                       —Claudia Card  
Despite the fractured nature of the “feminist critique” of ethics36, all of the 
various discourses ultimately “attempt to revise, reformulate, or rethink those 
aspects of traditional western ethics that depreciate or devalue women's moral 
experience” to “create a gender-equal ethics, a moral theory that generates non- 
                                                 
36 For example, the acknowledgment that feminist scholarship is a “site of active political struggle” 
in a “fractured and heavily contested discourse” found in R.B.J. Walker.  1992. "Gender and 
Critique in the Theory of International Relations," in V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States: 
Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory Boulder, CO, & London  p. 179.  
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sexist moral principles, policies, and practices.” 37   These discourses are most 
often divided into three broad categories: 
Feminist Empiricism 
          Feminist empiricists argue that gender-biased science only creates “bad 
epistemology,” arguing that once these biases are eliminated (by throwing more 
women and other minorities into the mix), a value-neutral epistemology will 
ensue to liberate knowledge.  This argument coincides with liberal feminism, 
which contends that gender equality can be gained by winning equal access to 
the educational and political rights enjoyed by men within the existing system.  
There are several critiques of liberal feminism worth noting.  First, other feminists 
argue that this position accepts male values as human values and assumes that 
women can and should aspire to be like men.  Another critique closely related to 
the first is that “male” standards are valued higher than those associated with 
women, such as interdependence and caring.   A third critique cites its emphasis 
of individual rights over the common good.  However, this feminist viewpoint 
remains popular with many women and women’s organizations that work to 
promote gender equality throughout the world.  Due to their efforts, more and 
more women are inhabiting spaces that were formerly the exclusive enclaves of 
men and demanding equal positions of respect (as evidenced by the growing 
participation of women in politics and the military in the United States.)  Liberal 
feminists usually reject the idea that women are more peaceful than men by 
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nature and argue that to effect change; they need to demand an equal voice and 
role in international decision-making positions, including roles in the military. 
Standpoint Feminism 
          Standpoint feminists assert that knowledge is socially constructed.  They 
view women's marginal position in society as a potential advantage rather than 
merely as an oppressive situation for women. They argue from the Marxist 
position that a socially oppressed class has valuable knowledge that is 
unavailable to the privileged class by the mere fact that it is oppressed, and 
therefore attempts to incorporate the standpoints of other marginalized groups in 
its quest for knowledge. One argument for the value of this theory is that 
“knowledge which emerges from women’s experiences ‘on the margins’ of world 
politics is actually more neutral and critical because it is not complicit with, or 
blinded by, existing institutions and power relations.”38  Most standpoint feminists 
view war from the perspective that exclusion from power leads women to be 
more peaceable than men because they must bargain from a position of 
weakness.   
  Within standpoint, the “ethics of care” approach is the predominant theory 
that speaks to the issues of war and peace.  This theory was born when Carol 
Gilligan published a very influential book in 1982 called In a Different Voice, 
where she described her experiments on how men and women react to various 
hypothetical situations. This book was prompted by her professor Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s contention that there were six stages of moral development , 
                                                 
38 True, Jacqui.  “Feminism.”  Theories of International Relation., eds. Burchill, S. and A. Linklater. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995,1996. 215. 
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concluding that only men could reach the highest stage of an “impartial, 
universalist, and principled perspective: the ethics of justice.39 In reply, her book 
proposed that Kohlberg’s results were mistaken because they were based on 
“male-biased” methodology that did not take into account the possibility of 
different kinds of ethical behaviour.  Rather, her study revealed that men and 
women have fundamentally different approaches to morality:  women focus more 
on ‘care’ and men on ‘justice’. Women base their morality on relationships and 
responsibility, whereas men focus on the traditional western ethics of rationalism, 
Kantianism, and liberalism.  
Nel Noddings expanded on Gilligan’s “ethics of care”, using an approach 
emphasizing particular others as the objects of care: 
To act as one-caring ... is to act with special regard for the particular 
person in a concrete situation ... she acts in a nonrule-bound fashion 
in behalf of the cared for ... [An ethic of care] does not attempt to 
reduce the need for human judgment with a series of “Thou shalts” 
and “Thou shalt nots”. Rather, it recognizes and calls forth human 
judgment across a wide range of fact and feeling, and it allows for 
situations and conditions in which judgment (in the impersonal, logical 
sense) may properly be put aside in favor of faith and commitment.40 
 
Along this vein, maternal feminists such as Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held, 
and Caroline Whitbeck, commemorate the feminine characteristics of mothering 
and parenting, arguing that “the experience of mothering, of caring for others 
could serve as an important ethical model for civic participation as well as a 
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corrective to citizenship based on military service.”41  Developing this proposal, 
Ruddick makes the case that mothering and war are incompatible: 
When maternal thinking takes upon itself the critical perspective of 
a feminist standpoint, it reveals a contradiction between mothering 
and war.  Mothering begins in birth and promises life; military 
thinking justifies organized, deliberate deaths.  A mother preserves 
the bodies, nurtures the psychic growth and disciplines the 
conscience of children; although the military trains its soldiers to 
survive the situations it puts them in, it also deliberately endangers 
their bodies, minds and consciences in the name of victory and 
abstract causes.42 
Feminists and non-feminists alike criticize these approaches for their 
emphasis on the specific relationships engendered by individual human 
relationships, arguing that they don’t translate into a general model that can be 
used to describe other types of relationships such as those between communities 
and groups.  Ruddick herself concedes that she might be “over-idealizing 
mothers, unnecessarily excluding men and nonbiological mothers from maternal 
work, and underemphasizing the differences that exist among mothers, some of 
whom find themselves "mothering" under extremely oppressive circumstances.”43  
Other critics argue that this stress on personal relationships creates a “partialist” 
approach in the ethics of care that must be integrated with the universal and 
rational ethics related to the “justice” orientation: “This means that unless 
exponents of a personal ethics of care wanted to take the hard-nosed view that 
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we never have any moral duties and responsibilities to those with whom we have 
no personal relationships, they would still need to devise and defend some 
ethical principles to govern our relationship with strangers. . . . An adequate 
ethics needs impartiality as well as care.”44   Nonetheless, standpoint feminists’ 
emphasis on particularity and personal experience creates the ability to identify 
with and take responsibility for the suffering of others, as seen in growing 
movements such as Women in Black, begun in 1988 by Israeli women 
empathizing with the plight of Palestinian women by protesting against Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.  Also, their emphasis on the necessity of 
incorporating multiple “standpoints” allows for ethical consideration of the diverse 
perspectives of parties to any dispute or conflict.45   
Postmodern Feminism 
“Postmodern feminism” is not easily definable, incorporating so many 
diverging viewpoints as to make the term almost meaningless as well as 
unfashionable in some circles.  However, this paper characterizes it as a reaction 
against the scientific method that disputes the definition of reality from 
objective/subjective or empirical/normative stances.   Rather, many of these 
feminists view reality as structured by discourse representing relations of power 
and domination, agreeing that the male/female dichotomy is a main categorizing 
force in our society. They criticize the structure of this society and the dominant 
patriarchal order within which women and other marginalized people are 
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perceived as the Other. Furthermore, they perceive any attempts to label their 
viewpoints as essentialist fallacies.  
 As postmodern feminists see it, all attempts to provide a single 
explanation for women's oppression not only will fail but should also fail. 
They will fail because there is no one entity, "Woman," upon whom a label 
may be fixed. Women are individuals, each with a unique story to tell 
about a particular self. Moreover, any single explanation for "Woman's" 
oppression should fail from a feminist point of view, for it would be yet 
another instance of so-call "phallogocentric" thought: that is, the kind of 
"male thinking" that insists on telling as absolute truth one and only one 
story about reality. Women must, in the estimation of postmortem 
feminists reveal their differences to each other so that they can better 
resist the patriarchal tendency to center, congeal, and cement thought into 
a rigid "truth" that always was, is, and forever will be.46 
     
Although not known as a “postmodern” feminist, Jean Bethke Elshtain uses a 
Foucauldian linguistic constructivism to examine the traditional roles played by 
women and men in war, concluding that they are socially constructed by the 
dominant historical narratives about the male “Just Warrior”/ hero who fights for 
the greater good and the female “Beautiful Soul” who plays the maternal support 
figure in need of male protection.   
To take up war-as-discourse compels us to recognize the powerful 
sway of received narratives and reminds us that the concepts 
through which we think about war, peace, and politics get repeated 
endlessly, shaping debates, constraining consideration of 
alternatives, often reassuring us that things cannot really be much 
different than they are. As we nod an automatic "yes" when we 
hear the truism (though we may despair of the truth it tells) that 
"there have always been war," we acknowledge tacitly that "there 
have always been war stories," for wars are deeded to us as texts. 
We cannot identify "war itself" as an entity apart from a tradition 
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that includes poems, epics, myths, official histories, and first-person 
accounts, as well as articulated theories.47 
 
Elshtain’s war-as-discourse analysis precludes the supposition that there 
is a link between women and peace, proposing instead that women’s attitudes 
about war and peace can differ substantially depending on such factors as time 
periods and cultures.48  She suggests that this linkage belies the fact that peace 
feminists are usually greatly outnumbered by the majority of women who support 
the wars that their nations wage, citing the example of women in the suffragist 
movement who rushed to support the war effort at the outbreak of the First World 
War while others handed out white feathers as symbols of cowardice to young 
men not in uniform. 49     
In Gender and ‘Postmodern’ War, Robin Schott  proposes that 
“postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics …render an event 
based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into 
account.”50  
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Feminist Critiques of Just War Theory 
But history, real solemn history, I cannot be interested in... I read it a little 
as a duty, but it tells me nothing that does not either vex or weary me. The 
quarrels of popes and kings, with wars or pestilences, in every page; the men all 
so good for nothing, and hardly any women at all--it is very tiresome. —Jane 
Austen's Catherine Morland in Northanger Abbey  
 
 What are the criticisms that feminists have about just war theory?  
Although few feminist scholars explicitly focus on this topic (Elshtain, Cohn & 
Ruddick in particular), others address similar issues within the broader scope of 
war and peace. Lucinda Peach groups these criticisms around several concerns: 
“its close relationship with realism, its failure to insist that all criteria have been 
satisfied in accordance with rigorous standards, especially in relation to 
attempting nonviolent alternatives; its tendency to abstract and to dichotomize 
reality in accordance with gendered distinctions; and the priority it accords to the 
state and to state authority vis-à-vis the individual.”51  All of these are legitimate 
concerns, but she misses one very important criticism of just war theory: it 
addresses war as a discrete event rather than a continuing presence in modern 
culture. 
Realism 
 Realists concentrate on states and their power relationships as the 
most important aspect of world politics.  Hans Morgenthau, a primary architect of 
this theory, assumed that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power,” creating a world system with an “astounding continuity in foreign power 
which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an 
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intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of 
the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of 
successive statesmen.”52  Sara Ruddick and Carol Cohn, identifying themselves 
anti-war feminists, believe that those who practice this type of politics view war 
as an inescapable part of this system.  They further declare that although just 
war theorists use normative methods  to analyze the justice of wars, their theory 
resides within the parameters of this realist assumption of war’s inevitability, 
therefore accepting war as a practice.  Cohn and Ruddick, on the other hand, 
reject war as a practice (while distinguishing themselves from pacifists by 
acknowledging those among them who continue to support particular military 
campaigns.)53    
   However, Elshtain distinguishes the spirit of just war theory as “a way of 
thinking that refuses to separate politics from ethics” 54, from the realist world 
where “no children are ever born, and nobody ever dies…There are states, and 
they are what is.”55  She argues that just war thinking is not inextricably linked to 
the realist paradigm, transcending the use of its rhetoric by realist states to 
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legitimize their struggles for power, asserting that “traditional just-war theory is 
not problematic so much because it is itself realist as because it is anachronistic 
and no longer able to provide meaningful limits to war in a world governed by 
realist assumptions.”56  For her, Michael Walzer’s argument that in the face of 
“immeasurable evil” (i.e. Nazism), a “supreme emergency” exists allowing the 
use of unjust means to achieve victory is a clear example of how realists violate 
the principles of just war for their own purposes.57  On the other hand, she 
maintains that  “when a wound as grievous as that of September 11 has been 
inflicted on a body politic, it would be the height of moral irresponsibility… were 
the relevant governments to fail to respond” by applying just war theory to 
exercise armed force in a responsible and limited manner.58 
Failure to Consider Alternatives to War  
Just war theory clearly states that a governing authority must reasonably exhaust 
all other diplomatic and non-military options for securing peace before resorting 
to force.  However, The United States Bishops’ treatise The Challenge of Peace 
is the only document on just war that attempts to fully delineate nonviolent 
alternatives to war and escalation of conflicts.  It is an impassioned reaction and 
statement against the use of 
nuclear weapons, and one of the first appeals for just peacemaking as an 
alternative to war:  
                                                 
56 Peach, 196. 
 
57 Peach. 196. 
 
58 Elshtain, Jean Bethke. “Luther’s Lamb: When and How to Fight a Just War.” Common 
Knowledge, 8.2 (2002): 304-309. 
 
 36
 We are the first generation since Genesis with the power to virtually 
destroy God's creation. We cannot remain silent in the face of such 
danger. Peacemaking is not an optional commitment. It is a requirement of 
our faith. We are called to be peacemakers, not by some movement of the 
moment, but by our Lord Jesus.59    
 
For Walzer, these statements prove his contention that a last resort could 
turn into “an endlessly receding possibility, invoked mostly by people who would 
prefer never to resist aggression with force.  After all, there is always something 
else to do, another diplomatic note, another meeting.”60 To feminists, this position 
underscores the fact that “last resort” criteria are seldom fully considered before 
hostilities are instigated.  According to Elshtain, “the American public seems at 
this point so inured to the rather routine use of American bombing in foreign 
policy situations that these actions scarcely register on the radar screen most of 
the time.”61   
Abstract Thought/Dichotomized Thinking 
Feminist analyses “specifically reveal how abstraction in the application of 
just war theory has resulted in (1) a neglect of the horrors of war and its effects 
on individual bodies;(2) a perception of the enemy as “Other”; and (3) a fixation 
on principles of justice and rights rather than the needs and interests of specific 
persons in particular conflicts.”62   
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For instance, a feminist former RAF officer in the Persian Gulf conflict 
illustrates the moment in which she recognized the duality in which the suffering 
of individuals was viewed: 
Around one week into the “conflict” proper, by which time we had lost 
several crews from our base during bombing raids, I heard the voices of 
some downed aircrew on CNN—two of whom were my colleagues. I was 
overjoyed that they had survived. Later, as I watched the video footage of 
their battered faces, and the news teams discussed the Iraqi breaking of 
the Geneva Convention through beating up downed aircrew, I realized 
how utterly stupid the whole thing was. We had been “bombing the shit” 
out of Iraq for days. There were obviously many Iraqis being killed. But 
beating up captured aircrew who had just bombed you was “barbaric” and 
“against the rules.”63 
 
This dichotomy is also apparent in the American media’s coverage of 
September 11’s victims as opposed to the civilian victims of the war in 
Afghanistan.  When the New York Times put a human face to the thousands who 
perished in the Twin Towers by featuring vignettes with pictures and mini-
biographies listing the victims’ interests and families, they created an 
ineradicable image by visualizing the personal aspects of the loss.  Howard Zinn 
was deeply moved by those intimate glimpses of the real people lost in the 
tragedy, speculating “what if all those Americans who declare their support for 
Bush's "war on terrorism" could see, instead of those elusive symbols--Osama 
bin Laden, Al Qaeda--the real human beings who have died under our bombs?”64  
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Ira Chernus relates how President Eisenhower’s administration exploited this 
good/evil rhetoric in its foreign policy: 
Everything had to be woven into the system (as loosely articulated as it 
was) and circumscribed within its absolute demarcations between truth 
and falsehood, right and wrong. Therefore all realities had to be 
dichotomized; everything had to be treated only in relation to its absolute 
opposite. Dichotomizing and polarizing were the only path he could see 
leading to clarity. In political terms, freedom, capitalism, and "the American 
way" could be meaningful only if pitted against their absolute opposites. 
Hence the need to construct discursively an imminent foreign and 
domestic "Red menace," so that the nation could be called to make a 
decisive choice between the opposites.65 
 
Feminists argue that just war theory stresses the notions of just/unjust and 
good/evil wars, reinforcing the ability to abstract the enemy as the “Other”, 
making their annihilation much more palatable.  Further, standpoint feminists 
argue that its emphasis on rights and justice promotes separation rather than 
connection, leading to the likelihood of more, not less recourse to aggression.  If, 
for example, the victor’s terms of justice in the wake of the war are perceived as 
unduly harsh by the vanquished, will the end of war bring a true peace?  
“Typically”, Cohn and Ruddick state, “‘peace’ includes official ongoing 
“punishment”—retribution, reparations, domination, and deprivation.”66  This is 
evident in Orend’s jus post bellum principles, which emphasize rights vindication 
and the question of punishment over mediation and reconciliation.  Issues such 
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as war crimes trials are more comfortable within this framework than discussions 
of creating a just peace.67 
Suppression of Individual Rights by the State 
Just war theory requires that a war must be endorsed by a person or entity 
that has the proper authority to do so, privileging the rights of the state over the 
rights of individuals in the name of the “common good”.  Government reactions to 
catastrophic events such as September 11, including the passing of legislation, 
(i.e. Patriot Act I) or the detention of certain individuals based on their ethnicity 
(Japanese internments during World War II) within the atmosphere of war allows 
what Sara Ruddick calls just war’s “unquestioning obedience as a virtue.”68 
Further, just war theorists since the Peace of Westphalia have focused on the 
sovereign state as the only actor, that is, the actor that plays the critical role in 
matters of war, ignoring the growing number of non-state actors in the 
international arena.  In relation to feminist theory, especially the ethics of care, 
this emphasis on states over individuals fails to recognize the importance of 
interpersonal a well as interstate relations.  
War as Event 
According to Barbara Ehrenreich, those who study war empirically as a 
recurrent event speak of its “epidemicity”—its tendency to spread in a manner 
corresponding to an infectious disease.  In other words, as Dutch social scientist 
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Henk Houweling observes, “one of the causes of war is war itself”.69  
Analogously, many feminists refuse to regard war as a series of discrete events 
(threat followed by invasion, battle, then ceasefire), considering it instead as a 
systematic expression of the society within which it resides, so that “in contrast to 
much just war theory, it …[does] not separate war from either the preparations 
made for it (preparations taken in the widest possible, including the social costs 
of maintaining large standing armies and the machinery of deterrence), or from 
its long term physical, psychological, socio-economic, environmental, and 
gendered effects.70  In fact, ethical approaches such as just war theory that “do 
not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the 
very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based 
politics and analyses.”71 
Conclusion 
In the just war scenario, there are only two sides, the aggressor and the 
victim, the victor and the vanquished.  However, the real world also contains an 
entire set of people who aren’t on either side, neither aggressor nor victim, with 
little or no stake in who wins or loses.  According to the anthropologist William 
Ury, this group  is the “Third Side” that can step in to resolve or lessen tensions 
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and conflicts.72  His assertion that peace is the norm rather than war introduces 
the next chapter’s discussion of just peace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 Ury, William L. The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop. New York: Penguin 
Books, 2000. 
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Just Peace Theory 
"The third side is a kind of social immune system that prevents the spread of the virus of 
violence."—William Ury 
Introduction 
William Ury questions the Hobbesian outlook that only a strong government 
can restrain human nature’s tendency to war and violence. Drawing on the works 
of Frans de Waal (Primate Behavior and Human Aggression, which questions the 
myth that humans are innately aggressive) and R. Brian Ferguson (The History 
of War: Fact vs. Fiction, which uses archeological evidence to prove that most of 
human history was peaceful rather than warlike), he asks how our ancestors 
were able to resolve conflict so successfully for so long?  He formulated his 
answer while performing fieldwork among tribes like the  Bushmen of  Kalahari, 
observing the way in which family, friends and the extended community 
intervened to resolve issues between contending parties.  He realized that 
conflicts never take place in a vacuum, strictly between two adversaries. “In a 
nutshell," Ury explains, "the third side is composed of people from the community 
using a certain kind of power, the power of peers, from a certain perspective, 
which is a perspective of common ground; supporting a certain process, which is 
the process of dialogue and nonviolence; and aiming for a certain product, which 
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is a triple win--a solution that's good for the community and good for both of the 
parties." 73                                                                 
Ury recognizes that conflict is natural and advocates positive interaction 
rather than mere opposition from outside, providing concrete practices for “third 
siders” to play in bringing resolution to conflicts.  Ury’s ten roles that “third siders” 
can play are: 
1. Provider: helping people meet their frustrated needs 
2. Teacher: instilling skills or attitudes to defuse tensions 
3. Bridge Builder: fostering good relationships across potential lines of 
conflict 
4. Mediator: helping people reconcile their opposite interests 
5. Arbiter: delineating the disputed rights 
6. Equalizer: balancing the power between clashing parties 
7. Healer: repairing injured relationships and defusing wounded emotions 
8. Witness: taking heed and note of early warning signs of dispute 
9. Referee: establishing objective rules for conflict 
10. Peace Keeper: stepping in to separate the fighting parties, even 
physically.74 
 How can “third-siders” work to prevent conflicts before they happen?  
They can be providers, teachers and bridge-builders.   How do they contain wars 
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while they are happening?  They witness, referee, and act as peacekeepers.  
How can they resolve conflicts?  They can mediate, arbitrate, equalize and heal.   
As Ury notes, “No one third-side role is sufficient to stop violence. The roles 
constitute a series of protective safety nets. If one doesn’t catch the conflict and 
stop it from escalating, another will. Together, these roles constitute a systemic 
approach to what is, after all, a systemic problem.”75  A similar set of principles 
and roles are found in the ten principles espoused in the book Just 
Peacekeeping (included in Appendix A). 
Feminist Just Peace 
 Unlike William Ury’s ten roles or Glen Stassen’s Ten Principles of 
Peacemaking, there are no written “feminist  principles of just peace”.   
 Liberal feminists prefer to work within the prevailing patriarchical system to 
win equal rights and access for marginalized groups.  In keeping with this stance,  
most embrace just war theory, with certain reservations.  Elshtain is a strong 
advocate for using just war principles as long as they are not couched in realist 
terms.  She appeals for a return to emphasis on the  jus ad bellum principles 
founded by Saint Augustine. Neta Crawford is not quite as enamored, stating that 
“each conflict demands its own analysis, which must occur prior to and 
throughout a war”, and although just war theory is a useful tool for this purpose, 
“it must be understood as only a crutch or partial palliative until the underlying 
pathologies can be understood, prevented and cured by more powerful 
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medicine.”76  What these voices bring to feminist just peace is a commitment to 
the use of strong principles before the initiation of hostilities.  Most importantly, 
just war theory’s principle of “last resort” can be resuscitated and placed within a 
visible and active just peace framework.  
 Ury’s concept of just peace is not new to women, who have long played 
these “third-sider” roles within their societies.  According to anti-militarist 
feminists (standpoint feminists among them), the problem lies in the fact that the  
contributions of women and other marginalized groups remain largely 
unrecognized at institutional and policy levels. However, because of this limited 
access to traditional avenues of power in decision making roles within 
governments and institutions, women have focused on grass roots organizing 
and non-governmental organizations as a means to power, managing to express 
their interests and concerns and placing feminist issues on national, regional and 
international arenas.  The Women and Armed Conflict List Archives77 provide a 
fascinating array of examples of such grass-root efforts from around the world. 
The views expressed in this archive “indicate that women and their organizations 
make use of innovative strategies for peace negotiation, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding….their main strategies suggest not only alternative means of 
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doing politics and peacemaking, but also alternate understandings of politics and 
peacemaking.”78 
One cooperative effort to raise women’s’ public visibility and effect change 
is Women Waging Peace,  a website launched in 1999 at Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government which creates a network of women in multiple conflict 
areas around the world who are “all demonstrated leaders among women peace 
builders, are elected and appointed government officials; directors of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); lawyers, scholars, and educators; business, 
military, and religious leaders; representatives of multilateral organizations; and 
journalists.”79 This project allows peacemakers with a variety of skills and 
experiences to interact with each other, studying the work that they do in diverse 
conflict situations and roles and advocating the inclusion of women in local and 
international efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Another avenue 
was made possible by The International Women's Conference in Beijing, China 
which played a large role in the creation of the International Criminal Court; the 
passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on issues of women, security 
and peace on October 31, 2000; and peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and in East Timor.80  The concerted effort of the transnational 
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice succeeded in their relentless determination 
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to bring charges of rape and sexual enslavement, issues traditionally relegated to 
the private sphere, against three Serbian men in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, an important milestone in the fight to bring 
recognition to these crimes as forms of violence and subjugation. 81 
An illustration of the power of witnessing and narrating truth is the Denshō 
Project, a digital archive of videotaped interviews, historic photographs and 
documents narrated by Japanese women and men of the Pacific Northwest that 
balances the “dominant narratives of regional history that minimize women’s 
experiences and foreground ‘‘heroic’’ actions of white males.”82   
In one narrative, peace activist Aki Kurose states, “Always realize that not 
to get involved when you should get involved is an act of violence.” 83   
Hannah Arendt defines power as the opposite of violence, stating that 
“where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent.”84 True power resides, 
moreover “where words are not empty and deeds are not brutal, where words are 
not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to 
violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities.”85  
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This definition is the cornerstone of women’s ways to just peace: acting 
cooperatively to effect change within existing systems and create new systems, 
witnessing and narrating their stories to reveal truth, and working to achieve 
equality for all marginalized groups by creating just and sustainable forms of 
economic development.   
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
Conclusion 
 
Just war theory is a reactive doctrine consisting of a set of guidelines that 
are meant to prevent unjust wars on a case by case basis.   Unfortunately, as 
can be seen by its long history, it has had to undergo periodic adjustments to 
address evolving cultural and social systems  and methods of war not previously 
imagined.  The theory is now facing its deepest challenges, with a militarized 
world system that is armed to the teeth with ever more sophisticated and lethal 
weapons.  Moreover, as can be seen with Walzer’s justification of means that 
would be unjust in normal circumstances, political and military actors have 
moved away from the principles justifying entry into war to those that govern the 
process of war.   The world is rapidly evolving from a system of states as primary 
actors to one that includes an interrelated assortment of local, regional, and non-
governmental participants.  At the same time that modern wars are fought with 
increasing savagery and destructiveness, just war theorists have primarily moved 
from philosophical to procedural rules about going to war, emphasizing 
international law, which is known to “confirm much more power than it denies.”86  
Just peace, on the other hand, works within any human system because it has 
always regarded conflict from a holistic perspective, as something that exists in 
all levels and arenas of human existence.  Feminists reject the dichotomized 
rhetoric inherent in current discussions of war that refuses to acknowledge the 
interrelationship between domestic, national and international violence.   Just war 
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theory perpetuates dichotomized views of war because it does not define war as 
something that exists within the system that perpetuates the culture of violence.  
Rather, it looks at each war as a specific event, analyzing each on a case by 
case basis.  This is a reactive theory that cannot deal with the underlying 
problems inherent in the surrounding system that are the causes of conflict.   
This paper has shown that just peace is an active theory that promotes 
practices leading to the reduction of violence in all arenas and at all levels, from 
fights in the schoolyard to ethnic conflicts and beyond. It affirms the 
interrelationship between violence and the militarism prevalent in current society 
and provides principles that can be used by people who are in traditional roles of 
authority as well as those in non-traditional grassroots, community or 
organizational levels and in all situations where violence exists.  Just war theory 
can certainly continue to play a role but should be one tool within the larger 
framework of just peace theory. 
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Appendix A: Just Peacemaking: Ten Practices for Abolishing War  
 (Pilgrim Press: August, 1998)  
  Summary of the theory for the panel on Just Peacemaking Theory  
at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion   
Orlando, Florida, November, 1998  
 
Part One: PEACEMAKING INITIATIVES  
1. Support nonviolent direct action.  
 Nonviolent Direct Action is spreading widely, ending dictatorship in the 
Philippines, ending rule by the Shah in Iran, bringing about nonviolent revolutions 
in Poland, East Germany, and Central Europe,  transforming injustice into 
democratic change in human rights movements in Guatemala, Argentina, and 
elsewhere in Latin America, in South Africa.... Governments and people have the 
obligation to make  room for and to support nonviolent direct action.  
2. Take independent initiatives to reduce threat.  
 Independent initiatives: 1) are independent of the slow process of negotiation; 2) 
decrease threat perception and distrust but do not leave the initiator weak; 3) are 
verifiable actions; 4) and carried out at  the announced time regardless of the 
other side's bluster; 5) have their purpose clearly announced--to shift toward de-
escalation and to invite reciprocation; 6) come in a series; initiatives should 
continue in  order to keep inviting reciprocation. This new practice has been 
crucial in several recent breakthroughs.  
3. Use cooperative conflict resolution.  
1) Active partnership in developing solutions, not merely passive cooperation. 2) 
Adversaries listen to each other and experience each others' perspectives, 
including culture, spirituality, story, history and  emotion. 3) Seek longterm 
solutions which help prevent future conflict. 4) Seek justice as a core component 
for sustainable peace.  
 4. Acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and 
forgiveness.  
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 Until recently, it was widely agreed that nations would not express regret, 
acknowledge responsibility, or give forgiveness. But Germany since World War 
II, Japan and Korea, Clinton in Africa, the U.S.  finally toward Japanese-
Americans during World War II, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, and other actions described by Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies and 
Wink, When Powers Fall,  show a crucial new practice is emerging that can heal 
longstanding bitternesses.  
Part Two: JUSTICE  
 5. Advance democracy, human rights, and religious liberty.  
Extensive empirical evidence shows that the spreading of democracy and 
respect for human rights,  including religious liberty, is widening the zones of 
peace. Democracies fought no wars against one another during the entire 
twentieth century. They had fewer civil wars. And they generally devoted lower  
shares of their national products to military expenditures, which decreases 
threats to other countries.  
   Ties of economic interdependence by trade and investment also decrease the 
incidence of war.  Engagement in international organizations like the UN and 
regional institutions is a clear predictive factor that they will be much less likely to 
engage in war.  
 6. Foster just and sustainable economic development.  
Sustainable development occurs where the needs of today are met without 
threatening the needs of  tomorrow--where those who lack adequate material 
and economic resources gain access, and those who have learn to control 
resource use and prevent future exhaustion.  
 A key to economic development in East Asian countries, especially Korea and 
Taiwan, has been land reform that made wealth more equitable and thus created 
a sizable local market for developing firms. By  contrast, Latin America lacks real 
land reform and equality, and therefore local consumers cannot afford to buy 
products produced by local industries.  
Part Three: LOVE AND COMMUNITY  
7. Work with emerging cooperative forces in the international system.  
 Four trends have so altered the conditions and practices of international  
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relations as to make it possible now, where it was not possible before, to form 
and sustain voluntary associations for peace and other  valuable common 
purposes that are in fact working: the decline in the utility of war; the priority of 
trade and the economy over war; the strength of international exchanges, 
communications, transactions, and  networks; and the gradual ascendancy of 
liberal representative democracy and a mixture of welfare-state and laissez-faire 
market economy. We should act so as to strengthen these trends and the 
international  associations that they make possible.  
8. Strengthen the United Nations and international efforts for cooperation and 
human rights.  
 Acting alone, states cannot solve problems of trade, debt, interest rates; of 
pollution, ozone depletion, acid rain, depletion of fish stocks, global warming; of 
migrations and refugees seeking asylum; of  military security when weapons 
rapidly penetrate borders.  
Therefore, collective action is increasingly necessary. U.S. citizens should press 
their government to pay  its UN dues and to act in ways that strengthen the 
effectiveness of the United Nations, of regional organizations, and of multilateral 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building. They resolve  conflicts, 
monitor, nurture, and even enforce truces. They meet human needs for food, 
hygiene, medicine, education, and economic interaction. Most wars now happen 
within states, not between states;  therefore, collective action needs to include 
UN-approved humanitarian intervention in cases like the former Yugoslavia, 
Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda "when a state's condition or behavior results in... 
grave  and massive violations of human rights."  
9. Reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade.  
 A key factor in the decrease of war between nations is that weapons have 
become so destructive that war is not worth the price. Reducing offensive 
weapons and shifting toward defensive force structures  strengthens that 
equation. Banning chemical and biological weapons, and reducing strategic 
(long-range) nuclear warheads from 3,500 to 1,000 each, are key steps.  
 Arms imports by developing nations in 1995 dropped to one-quarter of their peak 
in 1988. But the power of money invested by arms manufacturers in politicians' 
campaigns is a major obstacle to reductions.  
10. Encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary associations. 
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 The existence of a growing worldwide people's movement constitutes one more 
historical force that makes just peacemaking theory possible. They learn 
peacemaking practices and press governments to  employ these practices; 
governments should protect such associations in law, and give them accurate 
information.  
Each practice is recent in its widespread use, and is causing significant change. 
Together they exert  strong influence, decreasing wars. Each is empirically 
happening and being effective in abolishing some wars. Each faces significant 
obstacles and blocking forces that are named in the chapters. We contend  that 
just peacemaking practices are ethically obligatory for persons, groups, and 
governments to strengthen them and help overcome the blocking forces.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
